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 ‘Clock-watching and box-ticking’: British Local 
Authority Planners and Performance Targets 
 
 
Abstract 
The speed of the statutory planning system has concerned UK Governments for 
decades. The Labour Government of 1997-2010 placed particular emphasis on 
increasing the efficiency of public services through performance targets. Whilst the 
subsequent Coalition Government of 2010-2015 removed many targets, those 
measuring the speed of planning application processing were kept. Empirical material 
exploring how British local authority planners responded to these targets suggests they 
have both restricted and empowered professionals and, whilst changes to practice have 
occurred, professional identities have remained more resilient. This contradictory 
picture highlights the importance of considering the role of frontline professionals in 
implementing reforms. 
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‘Clock-watching and box-ticking’: British Local 
Authority Planners and Performance Targets 
 
 
Targets, planning and ‘time-thieves’ 
In October 2009, the BBC reported that British television presenter Noel Edmonds had 
been observed driving his personal ‘London cab’ in bus lanes in Bristol with a sign on 
the back of the vehicle saying ‘Action Against Time-thieves’.  Apparently Edmonds had 
launched a campaign “against people who waste his time”, including the local authority 
officers who had designated the bus lanes on the routes Edmonds wished to drive along 
(BBC News, 2009: online). The striking image of a ‘time-thief’ appeals to a widespread 
popular imagination of public service bureaucracy, an image which has come to 
dominate public discourse in the UK in the last decade. This includes planning, with 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair telling the CBI in 2006, “Planning, hopelessly 
bureaucratic” (in LGC, 2006: online), and current Prime Minister David Cameron 
announcing “we are taking on the enemies of enterprise…The town hall officials who 
take forever with those planning decisions that can be make or break for a business - 
and the investment and jobs that go with it” (2011: online). 
 
Concern with the speed of the public sector, including the local authority planning 
system, has been a significant policy imperative for central government in the UK for 
years and clearly resonates with a wider international trend whereby traditional welfare 
states are being reshaped and reimagined in accordance with the tenants of the New 
Public Management (NPM) (Clarke, 2004). NPM can be understood as a highly 
normative corporate archetype of public sector organisation quite distinct from the 
traditional public administration models. A particular emphasis is placed on 
‘efficiency’, which has come to be seen as the sine non qua of public services, in 
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contrast to more traditional goals of equity, democracy deliberation and social justice 
(Du Gay, 2004). This clearly has wide-ranging implications, not just for the citizen-
consumers of public services, but also for the professionals providing these services. 
 
According to the NPM, where services cannot be marketized to increase efficiency, 
managerialist practices should be adopted (Sanderson, 2001). A key tool of 
managerialism is the use of performance targets, which were used extensively by the 
1997-2010 UK Labour Government. Top-down targets were imposed across the public 
sector, and particularly in local government (Cowell and Martin, 2003). For local 
authority planning, the overriding concern was to use targets to speed up the system, 
which was widely seen as too slow at processing applications, too variable between 
authorities in terms of efficiency, and causing delays which could then threaten 
competitiveness in a modern global economy (DTLR, 2001).  
 
Such concern with the timeliness of the statutory planning system manifested itself in 
the form of targets for the percentage of minor planning applications processed in 8 
weeks and major applications processed in 13 weeks applied in England, Scotland and 
Wales. These targets can actually be traced back to a 1975 government report, the 
Dobry Report (Booth, 2002), but assumed a new significance under the Labour 
Government by becoming part of the wider Best Value (BV) indicator set of targets for 
local government introduced in 1999 (Allmendinger et al., 2003a), increasing the 
publicity of the performance by local authorities against targets. Furthermore, in 
England, the targets became heavily incentivized through a link to both financial 
rewards (the ‘Planning Delivery Grant’ or PDG) for good performance and penalties in 
terms of the threat of central government intervention in poorly performing local 
planning departments (the so-called ‘Standard Authority’ designation). After 2002, 
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planning target performance also counted towards the government’s overall assessment 
of a local authority under the ‘Comprehensive Performance Assessment’ (CPA) process 
(Allmendinger et al., 2003b). 
 
Concerted effort from central government to speed-up the planning system thus became 
a key part of a wider modernisation agenda. Whilst a number of government-funded 
studies questioned the overall effectiveness of these time-based development 
management targets (see Egan, 2004 and Killian Pretty, 2008), they continued to be 
measured throughout the Labour Government’s period in office. The Coalition 
Government of 2010-2015 then swept-away CPA and many central government 
imposed targets, but the speed of planning application determination remained a 
measure on their ‘single data list’ of targets in England (DCLG, 2011) and continues to 
be measured and reported on in Scotland and Wales as well (Scottish Government 2015; 
Welsh Government, 2015). Although the planning performance targets thus exist across 
Great Britain, post-devolution, the greatest concern with the speed of planning has been 
evident in England: whilst the reward of PDG was abolished by the Coalition 
Government, the threat of intervention for poor performing authorities was 
strengthened, with a new power for ‘special measures’ to be applied so applicants could 
submit directly to central government’s Planning Inspectorate and bypass poorly 
performing authorities (DCLG, 2014). 
 
The impact of targets on the public sector in general has received a great deal of 
academic attention, but there is comparatively little literature on the impacts of targets 
on the planning profession (Carmona and Sieh, 2005). This is a significant gap because 
it is important that planning scholars take account of the socio-political context in which 
planning is embedded, because the particular emphasis on targets under Labour provide 
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a case study of a state modernisation agenda with significant implications for frontinline 
professionals, and because of the continued currency of concern about the speed of the 
statutory planning system in both the UK and other countries. Furthermore, there are 
very few accounts from frontline planning practitioners themselves, unlike other areas 
of the public sector such as policing, where a number of officers have written books 
about their everyday experience of the impact of targets (WPC Bloggs, 2007; PC 
Copperfield, 2006).  
 
This paper aims to address the gap concerning the impact of targets on the everyday 
professional life and autonomy of frontline local authority planners by examining their 
reaction to the time-based performance targets in Britain during the period 2004-08. The 
paper draws on extensive original empirical material which illuminates how auditing 
culture interacts with professional activities, which also reshape planners own 
perspectives of reform. In doing so, I aim to contribute less to the debate specifically 
about measuring quality in planning (see Allmendinger, 2009) but more generally to 
consider what the example of targets reveals about the agency of public sector 
professionals in responding to managerialist reforms which continue to reshape the 
delivery of planning in the UK and elsewhere. The paper first considers how 
understanding performance targets as part of a wider process of public sector reform 
raises important questions about the agency of frontline professionals in practice, before 
considering the response of British local authority planners to performance targets. 
 
Frontline professionals in an audit society 
The growth of the ‘management by numbers’ (Hood, 2007) approach to governing has 
been termed an ‘audit explosion’ by Power (1999) who contends that we are seeing the 
rise of an ‘audit society’. The introduction of targets rooted in performance 
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measurement systems from the private sector tradition of productivity management by 
New Labour was part of a remaking of the state as one dominated by the economic 
rationality of managerialism in place of bureau-professionalism (Cochrane, 2004).   
 
There is considerable academic debate about the desirability of targets in the public 
sector in general (Hood, 2007; McLean et al., 2007; Andrews et al., 2003) and in 
planning specifically (Wong and Watkins, 2009; Carmona and Sieh, 2005; Houghton, 
1997). Often, the literature presents a monolithic picture of deprofessionalisation, of 
professionals undermined by the rise of managerialism (Duyvendak et al., 2006), with 
concern targets commodify work and lead to perverse consequences which may actually 
undermine the services they are meant to improve (Adcroft and Willis, 2005; 
Noordegraaf, 2006).   
 
Some studies of the implementation of managerialist reforms, however, have found that 
there is an active struggle for compliance at the frontline of the state and spaces are 
presented for alternative meanings and forms of practice (Davies and Thomas, 2003; 
Clarke and Newman, 1997). Indeed, Kolsaker suggests managerialism does not fully 
displace professionalism, with professionals able to preserve ‘autonomous niches’ 
(2008: 513).  This links to a broader concern of public administration theorists with the 
agency of frontline professionals in responding to policy change: many scholars have 
argued that policies are made and remade as they are implemented through processes of 
mediation, negotiation and modification (Ellis, 2011). Thus, understanding targets as a 
part of public sector reform may offer differing perspectives to those scholars who have 
tended to think of them more in isolation as a tool of government.   
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A particular concern appears to surround the agency and autonomy of frontline 
professionals when public sector reform is implemented. In studying local government 
modernisation, Vivien Lowndes (2005) uses the framework of ‘institutionalism’, 
arguing convincingly for its appropriateness in the face of the conceptual challenge of 
competing narratives of change of local government which highlight both resistance and 
acceptance of NPM style reforms. In this context, institutions are not simply 
administrative and political organisations but formal and informal rules, norms, customs 
and practices which guide and constrain an actor’s behaviour (Lowndes and Wilson, 
2003). The performance regime in planning might thus be understood as institutions, as 
might also the planning profession, the public service ethos, and what Stewart (2000: 
43) calls ‘the inherited world of local government’. 
 
Central to institutionalism is an attempt to understand the relationship between the 
individual and the setting for determining behaviour, with institutions constraining 
behaviour yet also being changed incrementally (Peters, 1999); a dialectic relationship 
where actors are both framed by forces imposing structuring imperatives on social 
relations but also themselves actively constitute and change those structures, making 
and remaking institutions on a daily basis (Healey, 2007). Attempts at reform may 
prove difficult as new institutions are hijacked or resisted by those benefiting from 
existing arrangements or seeing new rules as hostile to their interests. More generally, 
new rules will be adapted to local environments, organisations and groups which may 
all have capacity to absorb co-opt or deflect new initiatives (Lowndes and Wilson, 
2003). Indeed, a key idea in institutionalism is ‘sedimentation’: current practices are 
built on those of the past, with layers of values and understandings left from earlier 
times influencing new initiatives. 
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Such an approach offers a powerful frame for understanding the reaction to public 
sector reform, including performance targets, by professional local authority planners, 
and their role in enacting those same reform processes. It also places an emphasis on 
further understanding the actual reaction to reform in practice, which this paper seeks to 
provide. The following discussion is structured around first considering to what extent 
the performance targets were a structuring imperative, then considering how practices 
were being changed in response to this new system wide trigger for change, before 
considering to what extent new values were inculcated. Finally, consideration is given 
to what extent institutional entrepreneurs sought to use change to further their own 
interests. 
 
Researching targets in local authority planning practice 
This paper examines how local authority planners were responding to targets by 
drawing upon extensive empirical research conducted as part of a larger study 
investigating the reaction of  British local authority planners to a host of initiatives 
being implemented under the banner of ‘Planning Reform’ between 2004 and 2008.  
The research looked across Great Britain, given the broadly similar frameworks but 
different detailed approaches to planning reform being pursued by central government 
in England and devolved government in Scotland and Wales. The concern was not to 
assess any of the reforms per se, but to consider the experience of them by local 
authority planners and what this showed about the implementation of state 
modernisation, with a focus on institutionalism at the professional level (see Clifford 
and Tewdwr-Jones, 2013). As such, the focus was on local authority planners and not 
any of the other myriad of actors and stakeholders in planning. 
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A mixed-methods, iterative approach was taken to data collection. The first stage was 
17 exploratory interviews with Heads of Planning from a cross-section of local 
authorities. These exploratory interviews allowed key themes for the study to be 
identified and these were then taken forward through a six page questionnaire. The 
survey used Likert agreements, with respondents asked to rate how much they agreed or 
disagreed with phrases which were usually quotations from the initial interviews. The 
survey was sent via post to a random sample of 1,987 local authority planners selected 
from their professional institution’s membership list. Survey respondents were asked to 
volunteer for in-depth interviews and a further 53 interviews were then conducted with 
planners representing a mix of experience and managerial responsibility. For anonymity 
reasons, each planner was given a pseudonym appropriate for their sex and cultural 
background. The triangulated data presents a rich picture of how planners have 
responded to the target regime.  
 
Implementing performance targets in planning practice 
Valuing the measurable: Targets as a powerful new institution 
There were strong and frequently negative views surrounding the targets present in both 
the interview and the survey data. This suggests the performance targets were a 
powerful new institution structuring planning practice. Table 1 summarizes the reaction 
of respondents to the Likert statements about auditing and targets in the questionnaire.  
The survey data were examined to see if there was a significant relationship between 
geographical location, age, gender, job focus or local planning authority performance 
(against the indicators) and opinion on any one of the ten items on the Likert agreement 
(using Chi-squared tests). No significant relationships were found; whilst planning is a 
highly contextualised activity, these factors did not appear to be key determinants in 
deciding opinion, suggesting the common institution between respondents – 
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membership of the planning profession – may be a key determinant in patterning 
perceptions. 
 
Table 1 – Summary of responses for Likert agreement measuring how much respondents agreed or 
disagreed with various statements relating to auditing and targets on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree) 
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Auditing and targets have improved 
the performance of the service 
599 3.16 0.996 
 
3.00 
 
4.5 
 
25.5 
 
22.9 
 
43.4 3.7 
Auditing and targets have raised the 
profile of planning in the council 
599 3.26 1.029 
 
4.00 
 
3.5 
 
26.5 
 
16.7 
 
47.1 6.2 
Auditing and targets have increased 
the amount of stress for staff 
599 4.14 0.716 
 
4.00 
  
0.0 
 
3.5 
 
9.2 
 
57.4 29.9 
Auditing and targets have altered 
the way people work 
597 3.86 0.804 
 
4.00 
 
1.2 
 
7.0 
 
12.4 
 
63.8 15.6 
Auditing and targets have improved 
our relations with the public 
599 2.40 0.816 
 
2.00 
 
10.7 
 
48.4 
 
31.1 
 
9.5 0.3 
 
Targets should be abolished 
 
601 2.98 1.042 
 
3.00 
 
0.0 
 
42.9 
 
29.0 
 
15.6 12.5 
Targets are too obsessed with 
speed 
600 4.26 0.823 
 
4.00 
 
0.0 
 
7.0 
 
3.2 
 
46.5 43.3 
Targets restrict scope for 
professional discretion 
601 2.22 0.980 
 
2.00 
 
22.0 
 
49.9 
 
13.1 
 
13.8 1.2 
Targets correctly assess the quality 
of planning outcomes 
600 1.86 0.921 
 
2.00 
 
39.8 
 
43.3 
 
10.7 
 
3.8 2.3 
Targets places too much emphasis 
on applicants 
597 3.15 0.925 
 
3.00 
 
0.0 
 
28.0 
 
38.0 
 
25.5 8.5 
 
The interview data also suggested that the performance targets were a strong structuring 
imperative with a large impact on the professional life of planners. There were concerns 
expressed by interviewees that the targets were changing the nature of local authority 
planning, reducing it to the completion of endless paperwork and responding to 
bureaucratic requirements.  There was concern that targets had changed what it meant to 
be a planner, so now people simply ‘worked to the targets’, which had made the job a 
‘boring treadmill’. This seems to suggest that the targets somehow deprofessionalise 
planning by reducing it to a ‘tick-box exercise’ where there is nothing more than a 
‘treadmill’ of work ‘under the cosh’.   
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Figure 1 – Suggestions of a colonizing target culture in Planning (Cowan, 2007) 
 
Thomas was clear about this reduction of the role of the planner and was particularly 
concerned about the impact upon newer planners: 
‘What I’m concerned about is that particularly amongst the younger 
planners who are sort of coming into the process, just see the job as a piece 
of paper processing. It’s all about making sure that all the forms are filled 
in... At the end of the day you’ve then got to, having spent a lot of time 
ticking boxes, you’ve then got to watch a clock.’ 
There is some support for this in that one of those younger planners, Gwilym, said: 
‘I like being a Development Control officer. What motivates me is the eight 
week period.   I’m quite competitive about it.’ 
So he was motivated by the target, just as Thomas has feared.  This is by no means a 
universal feeling, but it lends support to concerns within the profession about the 
impacts of the targets on practice (see also Swain and Tait, 2007).  Such concerns have 
been reflected in the professional press (Figure 1) and suggest older values being 
deinstitutionalised and replaced by an overriding concern with efficiency. 
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The ‘Law of Unintended Consequences’: Targets changing practice 
There is some evidence, therefore, of the targets being a powerful institution structuring 
planning practice. A strong strand in the data suggested this change was not change for 
the better, with much concern about the consequences – unintended by central 
government – that they were having locally. Roger spoke about the inevitable 
distortions associated with the time-based processing indicators: 
‘If you just have a process driven indicator, speeding-up planning 
applications, you’ll end up with huge distortions in the planning system …  
People will sacrifice the output quality and the actual achievement of some 
benefit for the community, just for the sake of pursuing that single 
objective.’ 
Others spoke similarly about the ‘game playing’ that occurred due to the targets, with 
many examples given of the ways in which the processing of applications was altered 
solely to improve target performance. It is these which have received most attention in 
existing literature (see Allmendinger, 2009) which I will not examine here, but it is 
important to note that it was this area that interviewees tended to speak about at length. 
There was plenty of detailed evidence here that practice had changed in response to the 
increased emphasis on the speed targets, and often not in a way valued by many 
interviewees, suggesting a mismatch between practice and values. 
 
A number of interviewees felt the focus on performance meant they were providing a 
poor service overall. This is reflected in the survey material where a majority of survey 
respondents (59.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that ‘auditing and targets have 
improved relations with the public’ (compared to just 9.8% who agreed or strongly 
agreed). This again is suggestive of the idea practice has changed as the targets have 
been institutionalised, but as discussed later, underlying values may not have changed at 
the same rate. 
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It is also important to acknowledge here the very real impacts targets were having upon 
staff. A majority of interviewees spoke about the targets having increased job-related 
stress. The survey data provides strong evidence for this, with a large majority of 87.3% 
of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that ‘auditing and targets have increased 
the amount of stress for staff’, compared to just 3.5% disagreeing and none at all 
strongly disagreeing. Several planners tied targets directly to problems with job 
satisfaction, stress levels, sickness and retention problems. When asked what impact the 
targets were having, Margaret replied: 
‘Nervous breakdown!  No, exhaustion.  I was signed off.  One guy in DC 
[Development Control] has been off several months. Two of our senior 
planners in DC left.  They, one of them made a party political speech when 
he did leave. Said he was leaving because he was sick to death of 
government targets.’ 
By coincidence, one of Margaret’s former colleagues had received my survey just a 
week after he left the council.  He wrote a lengthy covering letter attached to his 
completed questionnaire, and in this he said: 
‘I left my job last week, having found the last 2-3 years increasingly 
stressful … Above all, the obsession with measuring ‘process’ (and, in 
particular, speed) rather than ‘outcome’ had damaged planners morale and 
stifled their creativity and professionalism.’ (Graham) 
 
We thus see that the targets have had a big impact on planning practice and a number of 
‘unintended consequences’ on both the planning process and planners themselves 
experienced. This reflects the picture presented in much existing literature, of 
managerialism leading to deprofessionalisation. Yet the criticisms planners make of 
targets suggest a rejection of a focus on efficiency alone as being what planning should 
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be about: as planners do implement reform, many conceptually distance themselves 
from it rather than fully internalise it.   
 
Ideological Concerns: A mismatch with the imagination of planning 
Criticism by planners of the speed targets was not just related to the unintended 
consequences resulting from the emphasis placed upon them; some also questioned the 
very ideological impetus behind the target regime. There was concern that targets 
represented a mistrust of local government by central government, and that there was an 
‘unhealthy’ obsession with efficiency. Margaret felt that the targets were a result of a 
philosophy that believed people could not be trusted to work for the common good on 
their own. There was a widespread sense that the targets were being driven by the desire 
to ensure that planning was both more business friendly and also run according to a 
more ‘business like culture’. Three planners specifically mentioned Michael Heseltine 
and his comment in 1979 about planning locking jobs in filing cabinets: 
‘We’ve been singled out as a department dragging our feet and holding up 
business. What did Heseltine say?  That we were tying up jobs locked in 
filing cabinets. So we’ve had it in the neck since then haven’t we?’ 
(Mandy)
1
 
Some interviewed contested targets in the light of older values about public service 
professionals needing to be trusted to work for the public good, a traditional idea of the 
‘public service ethos’ (McDonough, 2006; Hebson et al., 2003). 
 
Much more common than any specific attempt to unpick the ideological impulses 
behind the targets were concerns surrounding the specific impacts of the targets on 
planning. A key concern was that there was something wrong with the targets because 
of their focus on speed and their apparent blindness to outcomes, which did not match 
the planners’ concept of what was important and undermined their professionalism. 
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With regard to this focus on speed, the survey statement about auditing and targets that 
elicited the strongest feeling was ‘targets are too obsessed with speed’. Some 89.8% of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, with not a single 
respondent, out of 600, strongly disagreeing. 
 
In the interviews it was suggested time and again that the targets were too centred on 
speed alone and that this could have an inverse relationship with quality: 
‘We are so target orientated, so target driven, and I think on occasion that 
has been at the cost of quality … some discretion definitely needs to be in 
place when you’ve got important schemes.’ (Paul) 
Phil and Andrew developed the theme when they both suggested that in the longer term 
planners would be judged in terms of what was actually built on the ground rather than 
the time taken to process an application. This is reflected in the survey results: the 
statement about targets with the second strongest feeling was ‘the targets correctly 
assess the quality of planning outcomes’.  Some 83.1% of respondents either disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with this statement. There was genuine concern that, as Paul put it, 
‘the quality of development being allowed to get through the net are harmful to the 
quality of the environment’. There was also concern that the targets were leading to 
resources being concentrated on processing applications quickly rather than achieving 
good outcomes, and it was argued that the whole reason for having professional 
planners process applications is that they are able to exert judgement and actively 
improve proposals. This is suggestive that the idea of planning as about efficiency has 
sedimented against older ideals of professionals concerned directly with outcomes in the 
built environment. 
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A positive change to practice? 
We appear to have a narrative, so far, of targets undermining professionals, having 
unintended negative consequences and not matching the underlying values of what 
planning should be about. One of the most striking survey results, however, was that 
when asked ‘targets should be abolished’, just 12.5% strongly agreed and 15.6% agreed 
(28.1% totalled) compared to some 42.9% who disagreed. In interview, only one 
planner thought that targets should be abolished outright, and one thought they had once 
had a role but now needed ‘retiring’. Other planners were more supportive and feared 
the ‘free for all’ which might occur without any sort of target.  George was not unusual 
in commenting: 
‘No, I don’t think I would actually get rid of targets, no because otherwise 
what are we going to do?   I know I’ve said I think there’s too much central 
government control, but I don’t think there’s anything wrong with a bit of 
basic standards that they expect you to adhere to… Otherwise authorities 
can have a tendency to slip back into complacency.’ 
 
This raises the question of whether, although some older values of bureau-
professionalism remain resilient, they are at the same time slowly being weakened and 
deinstitutionalised as targets are institutionalised, to the point planners can no longer 
imagine professional life without them, or whether there might be alternative 
explanations. In support of the former, it was apparent that a number of planners 
thought that the targets have actually improved the way planning works, and that some 
speeding-up of planning was necessary. In other words, targets have achieved their 
stated purpose. In the survey, more planners agreed than disagreed that the targets had 
improved the performance of the service whilst in interview there was discussion of 
planning having needed speeding-up and that timeliness was an important part of 
quality of service.  Boyd commented: 
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‘I think the system probably did need some sort of incentive, some sort of 
speeding, there’s stories of applications taking years to go through.’ 
Tony went further.  He said that speed was important, and that the targets were vital to 
ensuring timely determination: 
‘However well-intentioned you are there are all sorts of things that become 
part of the professional routine that isn’t necessarily always serving the 
needs of other people. Any institution in a sense works to benefit itself 
rather than the people who are using it or supposed to be benefiting from it.  
I think it probably is necessary to have targets.’ 
 
As well as speeding-up planning, some planners also thought the targets had altered 
working practices. The survey data shows that 79.4% of responding planners agreed or 
strongly agreed that ‘auditing and targets have altered the way people work’. This 
implies the targets have been successful in terms of another objective, introducing a 
‘culture change’ in the profession, involving new practices and conceptions of planning 
and the role of planners. This does not, of course, show whether planners think that this 
altering of the way they work has been a good thing or not, but a significant number of 
interviewees did tell me how they believed that the targets had cut inefficiency and 
sharpened their approach. David spoke of the need for planning to become more 
performance-driven: 
‘Where we were before we entered a performance-driven culture was that 
we probably spent far too much time on almost fruitlessly chasing levels of 
quality and detail that were of marginal benefit to the area and its 
community and we needed to refocus our resources, given the push that, I 
think, everyone wanted to make in terms of regeneration.  So, yeah, we had 
to grow up, we had to change.’ 
Others endorsed targets because they felt they were useful tools, in ways that those 
implementing the target regime would have probably intended.These include 
introducing a more project management type approach and allowing comparability of 
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local authority performance. There was also talk about a ‘sense of discipline’ and the 
ability to identify best practice.   
 
Making the targets work for you 
The idea that targets are acting to slowly change the values of local authority planners to 
a new focus on efficiency is, however, undermined by other evidence of more resilient 
professional identities. Many interviewees highlighted how the targets had apparently 
led to increased delegation rates for processing applications, so planners were 
empowered to determine more applications themselves rather than simply making 
recommendations to elected Councillors. These increases in delegation rates may help 
explain why so many planners – 71.9% – reported on the survey that they did not feel 
that the targets had restricted their scope for professional discretion. This is striking 
because as we have already seen, the targets do restrict how, and for how long, planners 
process applications. Several factors probably combine to produce this result, in 
addition to the increased delegation rates: firstly, the planner can still recommend 
whatever decision they like so long as it is in the decision time (refusal within target is 
still successful from the Government’s perspective), but secondly, there is some 
evidence that planners have actually been utilising the targets for their own benefit. 
 
A number of ways planners appeared to be actively making use of the targets were 
evident. Firstly resource issues: the idea that the targets might be used to lever in extra 
funding to the planning department was mentioned frequently. Under the Labour 
Government, if you performed well on the targets, there was a financial reward from 
central government in the form of PDG. Authorities were apparently willing to alter 
practice to get hold of the funding (one interviewee explicitly linking the financial 
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incentive to increased delegation rates). Jim saw this as a major positive due to past 
inadequate resourcing: 
‘Planning has been pretty much just bubbling along for the last twenty years 
… there are real opportunities being created by being target driven. We’re 
having to employ the right number of planners, that’s brought a lot of new 
people in.’  
 
The survey data show that some 53.3% of planners agreed or strongly agreed that 
auditing and targets had raised the profile of planning within the council. The interview 
data suggest a number of reasons why, beyond PDG. This included the fact that the 
targets could be used to gain, or at least safeguard, resources locally. Paul pointed out 
that the targets had been essential in protecting a reasonable budget for planning: 
‘It’s difficult for councils. They’ve got so many competing things.  If you 
look at a unitary authority like ours, when the councillors have got a choice 
to close a school or put a million pound into planning, what are you going to 
do?  You’re going to keep the school open and say to the planners, ‘I’m 
sorry, we’ve got no resource for you’ ... So what it did, by introducing 
targets and rewards, they actually put us on an equal footing to things like 
education, highways and social services, which was again fundamental, 
absolutely fundamental.’ 
Similarly, others were clear that because they would not want to risk a poor target 
performance or becoming a Standards Authority, Councillors would not risk cutting the 
planning budget anymore.  
 
Securing resource levels was most frequently mentioned by planning managers, but 
more junior staff also seemed able to use targets for their purposes too. It was suggested 
several times that the targets could also be used to manage, or exert control, over 
applicants and developers. Simon outlined how: 
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‘We are more prepared to say, ‘Thank you, this is just not good enough, you 
can either withdraw it or we’ll refuse it, go away and come up with a better 
scheme.’ 
Similarly Patrick said that before the targets he would have negotiated at length, but 
now he felt empowered to tell applicants that they had submitted rubbish and should go 
and learn to ‘improve themselves’: 
‘What used to happen is we used to spend a huge amount of time with 
people who were hopeless  … [Now] rather than me spending a huge 
amount of time with you on an application that’s poorly submitted, poorly 
drafted, not thought through, I was actually able to say, well, actually, this is 
a really bad scheme.  I’m going to refuse planning permission.  You need to 
up your game.  It shouldn’t be for me to spend all my time with you … 
You’ve got to be cruel to be kind, I think.  Occasionally you’ve got to write 
a refusal and knock it on the head so that they hopefully will learn and 
improve themselves.’ 
 
Such ability to exercise control was apparently possible with regard to managing 
consultees and objectors as well. Rob said that the targets enabled him to cut back the 
‘endless say’ that the public wanted on everything: 
“I mean, there has to be, because the public want to have endless says on 
everything. And they’ll want to continue to have says, especially if they 
don’t like the answer or the recommendation that the council makes. Now, I 
don’t think there’s necessarily anything wrong with speed, ‘cos it’s the 
wider public interest that we’re trying to achieve” 
The comment about the ‘wider public interest’ is particularly telling of a certain self-
justification for the role of the professional planner which appeals to very traditional 
imaginations and identities. The contradiction between the focus on performance and 
that on community engagement – another longstanding strand of government reform – 
appeared to have opened-up spaces for professional planners to re-exert themselves as 
guardians of the ‘greater good’. Overall, the data thus shows that planners seem to have 
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actively used targets to lever in extra resource and recognition for planning, and to 
manage applicants and objectors. This is evidence of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ 
exploiting opportunities afforded by reform to further their own interests, and may help 
to explain why there was no strong support for the idea of abolishing targets. It also 
counters the idea that the rise of managerialism leads unproblematically to the demise of 
the professional. 
 
Targets restricting and empowering professionals? 
The speed of the statutory planning system remains a pressing concern for the UK 
government, like many others concerned to remove all perceived ‘blockages’ to 
economic growth. There is no doubt that the primary tool used to monitor and manage 
the efficiency of the system in Great Britain – national performance targets – have had a 
massive impact on local authority planners over the last 15 years. They have clearly 
been a new structuring imperative, which have changed practice in ways that have 
implications for the very nature of planning as a professional activity. 
 
The evidence in this paper reveals that rather than a simple story of acceptance or 
rejection of targets and their consequences, the response from frontline planners to 
targets has been complex and even contradictory, in keeping with responses to much 
public sector reform found by Lowndes (2005). There were some ideological concerns 
about the very idea of targets, a common feeling that the time-based processing targets 
were a poor measure, focussing too much on speed at the possible cost of quality and 
ignoring outcomes. Furthermore there were very strong feelings that the targets were 
distorting planning practice through a range of unintended consequences, so that the 
service offered to all users of the planning system became worse overall. There were 
also suggestions that efficiency alone should not be what matters for planners, and 
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concerns that targets somehow deprofessionalise planners, making them administrators. 
Indeed, there was clear evidence that governmental priorities have not been deeply 
embedded in the reflexive view of the planner’s role in so much as there was little 
evidence of any great inculcation of new attitudes and values about planners purpose 
being solely the efficient processing of applications in a business friendly manner.  
 
Strikingly, however, in the survey, just 28.1% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that targets should be abolished. There were a range of different explanations for this 
evident, ranging from the opinion that the targets had worked, that planning 
performance needed improving, to ideas that targets could be used to further the 
interests of planning and planners, for example by being used as a tool to lever in extra 
funding, to raise the profile of the service, and to help the management of applicants and 
objectors. There was actually some significant value to professional work from the 
time-based targets, which had apparently altered practice and opened-up spaces for 
institutional actors to further their own interests. This fits with what the institutionalist 
frame would lead us to expect when a strong new rule structure is implemented, and 
highlights the importance of a nuanced, empirically informed account of managerial 
governance. 
 
It is also noticeable that a fairly narrow range of positions were adopted by planners in 
reaction to this new institution, as it sedimented against existing local government 
processes and professional identities. Similar views from planners across Great Britain, 
despite the fact planning is devolved to the Scottish and Welsh governments, and the 
lack of difference in views from planners of different seniority or role suggests that an 
important common institution – professional identity – may be guiding the response of 
planners. This might help explain the evidence that whilst though work practices do 
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change in response to audit culture, and efficiency becomes the driver of managerial 
control within local authorities, the ethos of planning – the deep rhythms of its culture 
and imaginary of what it means to be a ‘good planner’ (Gunder and Hillier, 2007) – 
remain centred around a folklore of serving the public, with the ability to improve 
development proposals through personal intervention.   
 
Recent developments in England continue to question the value added by professional 
planning, however. Whilst Booth (2002) demonstrates there’s nothing new with an 
obsession with ‘streamlining’ planning to increase ‘managerial efficiency’, the emphasis 
placed on this by senior government politicians seems to be ever increasing. 
Accompanying his July 2015 budget, Chancellor George Obsorne published Fixing the 
Foundations, a policy statement which stated that the ‘detailed and discretionary’ 
planning permission process created ‘the sort of slow, expensive and uncertain process’ 
that reduces the appetite to build’, and that the government wanted to further ‘tighten 
the planning performance regime’ so that ‘all planning decisions [are] made on time’ 
(HM Treasury, 2015: 45-46). As Raco et al. have argued, for developers and business 
representatives, ‘slowness is elided with inefficiency and poor decision making’ (2008: 
2671) and the weight placed on democratic accountability, procedural integrity and the 
careful consideration of the public interest seems at a very low ebb. 
 
The evidence from this paper suggests that the results of this neoliberal obsession with 
the efficiency of planning will still be influenced somewhat by frontline planners as 
they enact ongoing reforms. This is perhaps the best guardian against the complete 
reduction of development management to nothing more than an administrative tick-box 
exercise rather than an area where value is added.  
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Notes 
1
 “Notoriously, Michael Heseltine (1979) as the first Secretary of State for the Environment of the 
Thatcher government complained that ‘thousands of jobs every night are locked away in the filing trays 
of planning departments’” (Carmona and Sieh, 2004: 118) 
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